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Abstract. According to the latest research of emerging technologies in the next few 
decades, an era of fully integrated Future Internet is coming. The Internet of Things 
(IoT) paradigm will be the one of the leading technologies in the transformation from 
nowadays Internet into the Future Internet. Many European projects related to IoT 
were announced this year, such as Horizon 2020. In definition, IoT includes smart 
objects, machine to machine (M2M) communication, radio frequency (RF) technologies, 
and a central hub of information. One of the major requirements for IoT is that objects 
must have a unique identity, which would make them practically addressable when 
exchanging information. To achieve that, RFID tags can be used. There are three types 
of RFID tags: active, semi-passive, and passive. Considering their basic characteristics, 
passive tags are the most suitable to use in IoT. Passive RFID tags can have certain 
security issues. In this paper, using the STRIDE threat model, potential issues of passive 
RFID tags are described and discussed, with the currently known guidelines for their 
elimination. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
RFID (Radio Frequency IDentification) technology is one step to fully automatic 
identification system. Nevertheless, it is not a new technology. First appearance of RFID 
goes in the period of World War II, but it was patented for the first time in 70ies. Mario 
Cardullo's device was the first true ancestor of modern RFID:  a passive radio transponder 
with memory. The first patent to be associated with the abbreviation RFID was granted 
few years after to Charles Walton in the early 80ies. A lot of effort was invested in RFID 
technology research and development since then. As a growing-up technology in last 
decade, it is used in different kinds of tracking systems (animal, postal package, airline 
baggage), in the automated toll collection, libraries, supply chain management, or passports. 
Nowadays, it is been an important part of IoT systems.  
The very first definition of IoT derives from a "Things oriented" perspective - the 
considered things were very simple items: RFID tags. With objects tagged with RFID and 
paired with an IoT application, different kind of consumers can improve their everyday well 
being or even save money. For example, a grocery list could be automatically generated by 
smart fridges considering the expiration date of products in it. This kind of list reduces 
waste of money as the consumer doesn’t purchase unnecessary items which leads to an 
overabundance of items with nearing expiration dates. One interesting combination of IoT 
and RFID tags in practical development certainly is iFridge, an intelligent fridge for food 
management based on RFID technology [1]. iFridge is an intelligent system which collects 
information about food with RFID tags in the fridge and based on that information suggests 
to an user some recipes for making meals. Also, it can be used as an reminder of lack of 
particular kind of food.  
There are three types of RFID tags: active, semi-passive, and passive. Passive RFID 
tags are the most suitable to be part of IoT "things", mostly from the perspective of tags 
cost. From user perspective, the IoT systems have to protect their privacy and to provide 
them high level of security. As an indicator of importance of security issues and their 
countermeasures in IoT systems, Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) started 
Top 10 project related to Internet of Things [2]. According to this project, 10 major 
vulnerabilities related to IoT systems in 2014 are: insecure Web interface, insufficient 
authentication/authorization, insecure network services, lack of transport encryption, privacy 
concerns, insecure cloud interface, insecure mobile interface, insufficient security 
configurability, insecure software/firmware, and poor physical security. Some of these might 
be caused by RFID tags, such as: insufficient authentication/authorization or insufficient 
security configurability.    
Unfortunately, passive RFID tags can still have certain security issues, if they are not 
used right way. Since there is prediction that in the next few decades IoT will play 
important role in ICT technology growth, it is important to prevent this security issues to 
happen. If we observe the technology roadmap of IoT given in Figure 1, it is more than 
evident that IoT will be in the top of research and development until 2020 and even 
longer. IoT will be used in ubiquitous positioning (locating people and everyday objects) 
and physical-world Web (teleoperation and telepresence). Both of these will manipulate 
with sensitive data, and will be potential points of attack to malicious users. Using passive 
RFID tags in that kind of systems might be harmful. To prevent this, a security threat 
model for RFID systems has to be defined, altogether with the potential countermeasures 
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for identified threats. Well-defined threat model can be helpful for further application of 
passive RFID tags in IoT.  
In this paper, STRIDE model is used for definition of RFID system's threat model. 
STRIDE is classification scheme for characterizing known threats according to the kinds 
of exploit that are used (or motivation of the attacker). 
 
Fig. 1 Technology roadmap for IoT 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, basic terms of RFID systems 
and IoT are introduced and described. Section 3 gives an overview of IoT systems based 
on RFID tags. Security threats and countermeasures for the passive RFID using STRIDE 
threat model are given in Section 3. The paper is concluded in Section 4.  
2. RFID AND INTERNET OF THINGS - TERMS AND CORRELATIONS 
RFID technology is a major breakthrough in the 
embedded communication paradigm which enables design 
of microchips for wireless data communication. They help 
in the automatic identification of anything they are attached to 
acting as an electronic barcode. Three basic components of 
RFID systems are: RFID tag, RFID reader and back-end 
server (Figure 2). 
RFID tag has a microchip that stores data and a 
coupling elements (a coiled antennas) to communicate via 
radio frequency communications. Tags are characterized 
by a unique identifier and can be applied to any kind of 
objects (even person or animal). They help in the automatic 
identification of anything they are attached to, acting as an 
 
Fig. 2 RFID system 
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electronic barcode. RFID reader consists of a radio frequency module, a control unit, and 
a coupling element to interrogate the tags via radio frequency communication. RFID 
reader may contain internal storage, processing power, or an interface to back-end 
databases to provide additional function [3]. The back-end server in RFID systems is used 
for information storage, such as tag id, different type of reports, etc. RFID systems can be 
used to monitor objects in real-time, without the need of being in line-of-sight (mapping 
the real world into the virtual world). Therefore, they can be used in an incredibly wide 
range of application scenarios, spanning from logistics to e-health and security. 
There are three types of RFID tags: passive, active, and semi-passive. Active tags 
have their own on-board power source and can initiate communication. Semi-passive tags 
also have an on-board battery, but they cannot initiate communication. They have long 
range, and often are very expensive. Passive tags are inactive until the reader "wakes" them 
up, they are cheap, and have short range. They have no ability to sense the channel, detect 
collisions, and communicate with each other. They respond only at reader commands.  
From the frequency point of view, active RFID systems typically operate in the ultra-
high frequency (UHF) band with frequency from 300 MHz to 3 GHz and offer a range of 
up to 100 m. Active tags are used on large objects, such as rail cars or big reusable 
containers. Passive RFID systems can operate in the low frequency (LF, covers frequencies 
from 30 KHz to 300 KHz), high frequency (HF, covers frequencies from 3 to 30 MHz) or 
ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio bands. As passive system ranges are limited by the 
power of the radio signal reflected from the tag back to the reader, they are typically less 
than 10 m. Passive RFID solutions are useful for many applications, such as:  tracking of 
goods in the supply chain, authentication of products such as pharmaceuticals, and 
embedding RFID capability in a variety of devices. 
Major disadvantage of passive RFID tags is their computational limitation for use of 
well-known and secure cryptoalgorithms. Consequence is lack of security comparing to 
other two type of RFID tags. Nevertheless, considering the fact that they are cheap, they 
are still used for different purposes (e.g. IoT systems).  
Objects in IoT are sensed through RFID or sensors, achieving the integration of 
human society and the information system. Sensor networks also play a crucial role in the 
IoT. They can cooperate with RFID systems to better track the status of things (location, 
temperature, etc). 
There are different definitions of IoT. Internet of Things (IoT) is a global network 
infrastructure, linking physical and virtual objects through the exploitation of data capture 
and communication capabilities. It can offer specific object identification, sensor and 
connection capability as the basis for the development of independent cooperative 
services and applications. These things are to be characterized by a high degree of 
autonomous data capture, event transfer, network connectivity and interoperability [4]. IoT 
is a new network that interconnect the wireless sensors and radio frequency identification 
(RFID) sensing devices through a wireless network and Internet technologies to achieve 
the overall perception of information, reliable transmission, and intelligent processing.  
The goal of the Internet of Things is to enable things to be connected anytime, 
anyplace, with anything and anyone ideally using any path/network and any service. IoT 
can be considered as a new revolution of the Internet. In IoT, objects make themselves 
recognizable and they obtain intelligence by making or enabling context related decisions 
thanks to the fact that they can communicate information about themselves. They can 
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access information that has been aggregated by other things, or they can be components of 
complex services. 
There are three basic IoT components [5]: 
 Hardware  made up of sensors, actuators and embedded communication hardware, 
 Middleware  on demand storage and computing tools for data analytics and  
 Presentation  novel easy to understand visualization and interpretation tools 
which can be widely accessed on different platforms and which can be designed 
for different applications.  
3. THE INTERNET OF THINGS BASED ON RFID 
IoT will offer specific object-identification sensors and connection capability as the 
basis for the development of independent federated services and applications, As it is 
explained in previous sections, RFID can be (is) used for an object-identification in IoT 
systems.  
RFID 
tag RFID reader IoT Middleware
Internet
RFID system Middleware system Internet system
EPC
 
Fig. 3 IoT based on RFID 
IoT system based on RFID usually consists of three parts: RFID system, middleware 
system and Internet system (Figure 3). In RFID system, RFID reader reads EPC 
(Electronic Product Code) from appropriate RFID tag and exchanges the code with 
middleware system over IoT middleware. Internet system usually consists of computer 
system and network server. EPC is unique identifier of each RFID tag. IoT middleware, 
according to [6] has to have following functionalities to manage interaction with a variety 
of devices: interface protocols (providing technical interoperability), device abstraction 
(providing an abstract format to facilitate the interaction of the application components 
with devices), central control, context detection and management (supporting context-
aware computation), and application abstraction (provides an interface for both high-level 
applications and end-users to interact with devices). There are some open source 
middleware for IoT, such as OpenIoT [7]. OpenIoT is an open source middleware for 
getting information from sensor clouds, without worrying what exact sensors are used. 
4. SECURITY THREATS AND COUNTERMEASURES FOR PASSIVE RFID TAGS 
Three main physical components of IoT are: RFID, WSN (Wireless Sensor Network) 
and the cloud, and all three of them can be vulnerable to particular type of attacks. WSN 
can be vulnerable on outside attacks (attacks from nodes which do not belong to a WSN), 
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interruption, interception, modification, host-based attacks, network-based attacks, etc [8]. 
Cloud can have huge set of vulnerabilities. The most common are: securely transferring data, 
accessing the data, data backup, password use, and privacy. Security is critical to any kind 
of network or software product and the first line of defense against data corruption is 
cryptography. 
As one of the components, RFID tags (particularly passive) are mostly interesting to 
malicious attackers, since they allow person tracking as well as the objects and no high 
level intelligence can be enabled on these devices. However, these complex problems 
have solutions that can be provided using cryptographic or some other security protection 
methods and they have to be more researched before they are widely accepted. In that 
purpose, threat model can be very useful. 
As the basic security goals, CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) are 
recommended from different security organizations. Confidentiality can be defined as an 
ability to hide information from those people unauthorized to see it. Integrity, on the other 
hand, is the ability to ensure that data is an accurate and unchanged of the original secure 
information. Availability has to be provided because it is important to ensure that 
information concerned is readily accessible to authorized viewer all the times. Since IoT 
is identified as one of the technologies that will achieve growth in the next five years, 
people are concerned of the influence that IoT will have to their ordinary lives. In July 
2014 Fortinet, a global leader in high-performance network security, published the results 
of an global survey titled "Internet of Things: Connected home" [9]. 57% of participants 
in survey were concerned about privacy and trust issues in IoT, and 67% were concerned 
about data privacy. Leak of confidentiality and integrity can lead to privacy and trust 
issues. Prediction from the same survey is that 61% homes will became "connected 
homes" until 2020. Accordingly, availability is also one important security goal that has 
to be fulfilled in IoT. 
To fulfill security goals in general, it is important to have well-defined threat model 
that will be useful for identifying potential security threats and their countermeasures. In 
[10], as a threat model for RFID security, STRIDE [11] is suggested. STRIDE is 
classification scheme for characterizing known threats according to the kinds of exploit 
that are used (or motivation of the attacker)The model has six threat categories (Figure 4). 
An application of STRIDE model for identifying security threats of passive RFID tags is 
given as the following. 
 
Fig. 4 STRIDE threat model 
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Spoofing. When an attacker comes into credentials possession of an authorized 
system user, spoofing might occur. To provide authentication mechanism for RFID tags, 
different RFID mutual authentication protocols were developed. Most of them were 
proved as inefficient. Passive RFID tags has limited memory and computational power 
and they use lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocols. Safkhani et. al. [12] 
described two protocols for passive RFID tags: one uses lightweight stream-cipher WG-7 
to provide confidentiality and authenticity, and the other one uses one-way hash functions. 
Both of these protocols are proved as vulnerable to tag impersonation attack (a forgery 
attack in which the reader accepts a spoofed tag as a legitimate tag, and the modification 
for vulnerability removal is proposed. Any secure RFID authentication protocol must 
provide resistance against all kind of forgery attacks, include tag impersonation attack. 
Tampering. Tampering in RFID systems occurs when attacker manipulates with data 
(modifies, adds, deletes, or just reorders data). The tampering has many dangerous 
effects, such as incoherence in the information system, exposure to opponent attacks, and 
mistakes in the production flow. There are two kinds of protections against tampering 
[13]: tamper-evidence (the feature of a process, device, or software, to detect the 
existence of tampering) and tamper-resistance (the ability to resist to tampering). Low 
cost RFID tags are very simple devices without a microprocessor, which implies the 
hardware tampering possibility is pretty high. Tampering actions may aim at damaging 
the device or at altering the system to access the code in order to reprogram it with a 
malicious one (e. g. code that will be able to execute insider attacks). In paper [14] fragile 
watermarking for RFID data tamper detection is proposed as a countermeasure for data 
tampering. The other possible solution is write activity record for RFID data tamper 
detection [15]. Watermarking is the art of embedding data directly within content, which 
is imperceptible to humans but readable by computers. In [16] a novel watermarking based 
tamper detection solution for low cost RFID passive tags which uses the 32 bit kill password 
as the cover medium is proposed. It can detect tampering anywhere in the RFID tag. 
Repudiation. Repudiation occurs when a user denies an action and no proof exists to 
prove that the action was performed [10]. To prevent this, a non-repudiation protocol is 
required. The passive RFID tags has a limitation considering the memory and the 
computational power aspects. They are not suitable for a non-repudiation protocol, which 
usually requires existing of digital signatures, timestamps, or an audit trial. The back-end 
server has to enable non-repudiation protocol appliance in the data processing.   
Information disclosures. Information disclosure occurs when information is exposed 
to an unauthorized user [10]. This can be threat to privacy, if the exposed information are 
individual (e.g. a fixed reader at a retail counter identifies the tags of a person and use that 
to provide individualized marketing [10]). One of the problems in low-cost passive RFID 
tags is that they do not provide authentication and privacy. As a solution for this issue, 
PAP [17] and IPAP [18] were proposed. PAP was proposed in 2009 and IPAP (as an 
improved PAP) was proposed one year after. PAP uses hash lock functions. Nevertheless, 
it might cause the privacy issues. IPAP has lower computation overhead. In PAP 
protocol, it is assumed that unauthorized reader (attacker) does not exist in the store. 
However, there is possibility of such case. This fact was used in IPAP, to solve the 
privacy issues from PAP. To prevent information disclosure without using of protocols, 
the killing tag, or the blocker tag can be used (non-cryptographic scheme). 
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Denial of service (DoS). Considering the fact that DoS denies service to valid users, 
DoS attacks can be easy accomplished and difficult to protect against. An attacker can 
shield the tag from being read with a Faraday Cage. In the debate over embedding tags in 
passports, it has been suggested that the passports have to be inserted into a foil holder to 
prevent this type of attack [10]. One of the ultra lightweight techniques used to prevent 
DoS on RFID systems is the Gossamer protocol [xxx]. Gossamer protocol comprises 
three stages: tag identification phase, mutual authentication phase, and updating phase, 
and it is inspired by SASI scheme. This protocol is proven to be vulnerable to DoS by de-
synchronization in [19], where an improvement of it has been  proposed.  
Elevation of privilege. It occurs when an unprivileged user or attacker gains higher 
privileges in the system than what he is authorized [10]. Using gained privileges, 
malicious data can be written in database (for example, using SQL injection attack) or in 
file system on back-end server. The authorization mechanism must be built in the back-
end server. 
Using STRIDE model, potential threats to passive RFID tags are identified, discussed, 
and countermeasures for their prevention are given. Given countermeasures can improve 
correct usage of passive RFID tags in IoT systems and help with user's privacy and 
security protection. Computational power of passive RFID tags is big issue, and since the 
set of secure algorithms that will provide privacy protection, there can be a lot of research 
on this topic in the future.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Privacy includes the concealment of personal information as well as the ability to 
control what happens with this information. Privacy is the most important part to 
everyday users of any type of ICT applications. It does not differs in IoT systems and 
application neither. RFID tags are one of the basic elements in such systems. To detect 
and/or manage RFID threats conventional security management approaches can be used. 
It is evident that the set of potential security threats to passive RFID tags is huge, and that 
the most proposed and developed security mechanisms are proved as insecure. In this 
paper, using STRIDE threat model, an overview of passive RFID tag is given, and this 
can be used as a guideline for secure using of passive RFID tags. The security of passive 
RFID tags is very actual research topic with a lot of problems to be solved. As one 
potential plan for the further work development of repudiation prevention systems on 
back-end servers can be defined.   
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